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Abstract 
We contribute to the finance literature in two main ways. First, we present a 
theoretical capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to price assets in different market 
structures. Second, we use our model to analyze whether when markets are 
partially segmented using the local or the global CAPM yields significant errors in 
the estimation of the cost of capital for a sample of firms from developed and 
emerging countries.  
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1- Introduction 
In recent years, both developed and emerging capital markets have experienced 
numerous changes including removal of investment barriers, economic reforms, 
introduction of country funds and depository receipts (DRs) as well as other financial 
innovations. One of the aims of these changes is to develop financially integrated stock 
markets. Indeed, a move towards integrated stock markets should lead to a lower cost of 
capital, greater investment opportunities, and higher savings and growth made possible 
by international risk sharing [Stulz (1999), Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and Carrieri et 
al. (2007)]. The same period has known a succession of severe crises of different 
origins and effects. Apart the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and the 2001 US recession, the 
2007-2009 global crisis, sparked by subprime mortgage defaults in the US, has strongly 
affected financial markets of almost all emerging and developed countries. These 
changes have increased the exposure of national markets to global risk factors as well as 
their degree of integration into the world market. However, since today’s national 
markets are neither perfectly integrated nor strictly segmented market [Bekaert and 
Harvey (1995) and Carrieri et al. (2007)]. Investigating the effects of these integrating 
changes on the international risk and return trade-off and cost of capital of firms is 
crucial for rational decision-making and capital budgeting. In this paper, we introduce a 
theoretical international capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for partially segmented 
stock markets and use it to assess, under the hypothesis of partial segmentation, the 
pricing errors made by investors who use domestic or global asset pricing models to 
price assets and compute the cost of capital of firms.  
             Our model permits to investigate the consequences of changes in the degree of 
stock market integration on the cost of capital of firms and the prices of assets under 
different market structures. If capital markets are fully integrated, investors face 
common and country-specific risks, but price only common risk factors because 
country-specific risk is fully diversified internationally. In this case, the same asset 
pricing relationship (the global model) applies in all countries and expected returns 
should be determined solely by global risk factors. In contrast, when capital markets are 
strictly segmented the asset pricing relationship (the domestic model) varies from one 
country to another and domestic risk factors determine expected returns. In other words, 
given their exposure to systematic global risk, assets traded in different locations will 
yield different expected returns [Karolyi and Stulz (2002)]. When capital markets are 
partially segmented, investors face both common and country-specific risks and price 
them both. In this case, expected returns should be determined by a combination of 
local and global risk sources. Thus, the degree of integration determines the value of the 
risk premium expected on different assets and thus the prices of asset as well as the cost 
of capital of firms.  
Stock market integration dynamic is affected by both institutional and behavioral 
factors. First, financial integration is a result of economic, institutional, legal and 
political factors. In particular, integration depends on the harmonization of stock 
exchange rules and the ability of foreign investors to access domestic assets as well as 
the ability of domestic investors to access foreign investment opportunities. In fact, 
access to worldwide investment opportunities, through direct means and homemade 
diversification, increases the exposure of domestic assets to global factor and therefore 
improves the national stock market integration level. However, we should mention that 
although regional and international harmonization of exchange trading rules encourages 
greater investor activity, it often allows flexibility in the implementation of clauses and 
therefore this partially harmonization could create partially integrated markets 
[Cumming et al. (2011)]. Second, behavioral factors such as risk aversion, relative 
optimism, and information perception may also affect the desire to invest abroad and 
thus market integration. Therefore, even in the absence of institutional barriers to 
international investments, indirect barriers can still discourage foreign investors and 
prevent world stock market integration. Thus, the process of stock market integration is 
complex, gradual and takes years, with occasional reversals and most domestic stock 
markets should be between the two theoretical extremes of strict segmentation 
(integration zero) and perfect integration [Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Carrieri et al. 
(2007) and Arouri et al. (2010,2012)]. Therefore, assessing the degree of market 
integration can appropriately be addressed only within the context of an international 
capital asset pricing model. 
         In the recent decades, the management science and operational research literature 
has introduced new theoretical works in the field of risk-return trade-off and asset 
pricing in different market structures [Bell (1995), Pedersen (2000), Huang (2008) and 
references therein]. Overall, one can classify the available models in two categories: 
theoretical domestic asset pricing models in which it is assumed that markets are strictly 
segmented [Sharpe (1964) and Ross (1976) among others] and theoretical international 
asset pricing models in which it is assumed that markets are perfectly integrated [Adler 
and Dumas (1983), Grauer et al. (1976), and Solnik (1974, 1983) among others]. 
However, there are no theoretical asset pricing models for partially segmented markets, 
except those developed in the vein of Black (1974) and Errunza and Losq (1985) in 
which a specific investment barrier is generally introduced and its effects on the 
equilibrium returns are derived.
1
 For instance, Black (1974) presents a model of 
international asset pricing in the case of partially segmented markets. The author 
develops a two country-model in the presence of explicit barriers to international 
investment in the form of a tax on holdings of assets in one country by foreigners. This 
model was extended by Stulz (1981) and Cooper and Kaplanis (2000). The authors 
show that capital budgeting rules depend largely on the level of taxes that discourage 
the foreign investors from investing internationally. A more general two-country model 
is proposed by Errunza and Losq (1985) (EL-85 hereafter). This model enables to 
characterize the mild segmentation of domestic markets. However, some of its 
hypotheses are too restrictive. In fact, the authors assume that all domestic assets can be 
traded by all investors (both domestic and foreign investors), whereas foreign assets are 
not accessible to domestic investors because of restrictions imposed by the foreign 
government. EL-85 show that the foreign assets are priced according to the traditional 
global CAPM, but there is a super risk premium, proportional to the conditional market 
risk, for the restricted assets.   
          Errunza and Losq (1989) (EL-89 hereafter) extend the EL-85 model to a 
multicounty framework. However, alike EL-85 the authors reduce segmentation factors 
to the only effects of capital flow restrictions and thus their model is again built on a 
simple explicit formalization of segmentation factors. More precisely, they distinguish 
between two types of securities: securities that can be traded by any investor in the 
world (the core of the market), and restricted securities (the periphery of the market 
constituted of N segments such that no investor can trade on more than one segment). 
No cross-investment between segments in the periphery is allowed and investors in the 
core are denied access to the periphery segments. Thus, segments (countries) in the 
periphery are assumed to be completely segmented. The authors establish that in a 
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 Other ICAPMs with similar barriers to international capital flows include those of Eun and 
Janakiraman (1986), Uppal (1993), Bailey and Jagtiani (1994), Basak (1995) and Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1995), and Easley and O’Hara (2004). For more works on portfolio and market 
efficiency, please see Dragota and Mitrica (2004), Charles (2010), Guesmi and Nguyen (2011) and 
Clark et al. (2011) and references therein.  
 
number of cases, their multi-country model leads to significantly different asset pricing 
relationships compared to the EL-85 two-country model. In particular, it allows analysis 
of integrative changes in the world market structure.  
Nevertheless, stock market integration is a complex and gradual process 
involving many different kinds of explicit and implicit barriers, and the models 
discussed above are clearly not flexible enough to investigate the complexities of the 
market integration. In the absence of an established theoretical model that specifies the 
economic mechanism moving a market from segmentation to integration, Bekaert and 
Harvey (1995) propose a purely empirical model of time-varying market integration that 
allows for the relative importance of global and domestic information on stock returns 
to change over time. This model is simply an econometric combination of a domestic 
CAPM and an international one. The integration measure is modelled as a function of 
national and global variables. An alternative ad-hoc model is developed by Carrieri et 
al. (2007) who adopt a time-varying version of two-country EL-85 model. The results 
of the empirical tests confirm the findings of previous works and argue that developed 
markets are highly integrated in the world market while emerging markets have low 
integration degrees [Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), Adler and Qi (2003) and 
Hardouvelis et al. (2006)].  
The current paper aims to fill this gap by introducing a more flexible theoretical 
international CAPM in order to understand the complex mechanisms that move a 
national stock market from segmentation to integration and to investigate the effects of 
this transformation on the cost of capital of firms and on the prices of assets. Instead of 
imposing restrictions on assets as in all previous models, we hypothesize that there are 
different types of investors and assume simply that some investors do not want and/or 
do not have access to foreign assets as a result of explicit and/or implicit barriers on 
inflows and/or outflows, barriers which may make markets partially segmented. Starting 
from that, we derive the equilibrium asset pricing relationship and investigate the effects 
of changing market structures on the prices of assets and the cost of capital of firms. 
The main theoretical implication of our model is that if investors do not hold all 
international assets, the world market portfolio is not efficient and the traditional global 
CAPM must be augmented by a new factor which reflects the proportion of the 
domestic risk undiversifiable internationally because of segmentation. The more 
integrated the markets, the greater the decrease in the premium required on this 
additional risk factor, and the lower the cost of capital. If markets are perfectly 
integrated, our model converges to the traditional global CAPM. Therefore, unlike the 
available theoretical CAPMs for partially integrated markets [Black (1974) and El-85, 
EL-89 and the models developed along these lines], our model posits that if a group of 
investors fails to hold the world market portfolio because of explicit and/or implicit 
barriers on inflows and/or outflows, the remaining investors will also be unable to hold 
the world portfolio and thus a part of the domestic risk can be priced to compensate 
rational global investors for the inability to hold the well diversified world market 
portfolio. 
The Figure 1 illustrates the main issues examined in this paper as well as our 
contribution to previous works on stock market integration and asset pricing models. 
The partial integration of national stock markets is the maintained hypothesis and thus 
asset returns are determined by a combination of local and global risk factors.
2
 We 
contribute to the financial literature by introducing a theoretical CAPM to directly price 
assets in that context. A pricing error may arise from an individual firm if the domestic 
CAPM (which prices directly local risk factors and potentially indirectly global factors 
through their effects on local factors) or the global CAPM (which prices directly global 
risk factors and potentially indirectly local factors through their effects on global 
factors) is used to compute the cost of capital instead of the partially segmented CAPM 
(which prices directly both local and global risk factors). The size of this pricing error 
depends on the degree of integration. We contribute to previous works by assessing 
these pricing errors for a sample of firms from developed and emerging countries. 
Indeed, our paper is the first to assess the pricing errors made when markets are partially 
segmented but investors use domestic or global models to compute the cost of capital of 
firms [Stulz (1995) and Koedijk et al. (2002)].   
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 Indeed, all empirical studies confirm that the two extreme cases of strict segmentation and perfect 
integration are rejected and that markets are actually partially segmented, but at different levels [Karolyi 
and Stulz (2002), Bekaert and Harvey (2002), Bekaert et al. (2003) and Stulz (2005)].  
 Figure 1 
Local, global and mixed computation of the cost of capital 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce 
our model and discuss its main implications. Section 3 assesses the pricing errors that 
arise if the domestic or the global CAPMs are used instead of our model to compute the 
cost of capital of firms.  Concluding remarks and future extensions are in section 4. 
 
2- Market Structure and Asset Pricing 
First, we introduce our hypotheses and main notation. Second, we derive the well-
known traditional global CAPM in the case of perfectly integrated markets. In this 
context, investors are assumed to be homogenous and are able to hold every asset in the 
market portfolio. Their holdings will be similar in the equilibrium. They divide their 
wealth between the risk-free asset and the market portfolio which contains all the 
available risky assets. Third, we impose restrictions on investors’ choices and derive 
their impacts on the equilibrium asset pricing relationship. In that context, we show that 
the available world market portfolio is not efficient and the traditional global CAPM 
does not hold. The available world market portfolio is less diversified than the actual 
market portfolio which would contain all the weighted national risky assets if markets 
were perfectly integrated. Thus, investors fail to form efficient portfolios and violate the 
two-fund separation theorem. We show that when assets are priced using the available 
world market portfolio, a part of the domestic risk should be priced in order to 
remunerate the world investors for holding the inefficient international portfolio rather 
than the actual well diversified portfolio. Finally, we compare our partially integrated 
model to the other extreme case of strict market segmentation.  
 2.1. Hypotheses and notation 
We consider a world in which: 
-  There are c countries and c risky assets (one asset from each country)
3
.  
- There are 1l  types of investors; different types of investors may exist in each 
country. Investors of type j ( lj ,,1,0  ) have no access to jk  ( ck j 0 ) assets, i.e. 
investors of type j have access to jkc   assets; they have at least access to their 
domestic assets. Denote by jn  the number of investors of type j  and 


l
j
jnn
0
 the 
total number of investors. In addition, let 00 k .
4
 
- Purchasing power parity (PPP) holds or that PPP does not hold but that the equilibrium 
price of currency risk is equal to zero.
5
  
- Asset returns are normally distributed or the investor’s utility is quadratic. Thus, 
investors consider only the two fist moments. Suppose that the investor j has the 
following utility function )(
f
j
WV : 
 
)(
2
)()(
f
j
f
j
f
j
WVarWEWV

                                                                                   (1) 
where 
f
j
W  is the investor j’s future wealth,   the risk aversion coefficient.6 The budget 
constraint of the investor j can be written as: 
 
)1()1( rRDrWW
j
i
j
f
j
                                                                                       (2) 
                                                 
3
 The number of studied assets does not affect our final results. 
4
 Investors of type 0 are investors who have access to assets from most countries via direct investment, 
multinational firms, and DRs. 
5
 PPP is one of the most heavily studied subjects in international finance and macroeconomics. Despite 
extensive research, however, the empirical evidence on PPP remains inconclusive even if recent studies 
using nonlinear econometric techniques generally support PPP [Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009) and 
Zhou and Kutan (2011) and references within].  
6
 Most of the recent works on portfolio selection have been done based on only the first two moments of 
return distributions [Wang and Forsyth (2011) and references therein]. Theoretical and empirical 
justifications of this assumption can be found in numerous recent works such as Basak and Chabakauri 
(2010), Levy (2010) and Johnstone and Lindley (2011). However, we should notice that there is a 
controversy over the issue of whether higher moments should be considered in portfolio selection [Li et 
al. (2011) and references therein].  
where ijW  is the initial wealth, r the risk free rate and R  such as ),,,( 21 cRRRR 

 is 
the vector of returns of the c national risky assets.
7
 ),,,(
21 c
jjjj
dddD 

 is the vector of 
investor j’s amount invested in the c national risky assets expressed in the currency of 
the reference country.
8
 
 
 
 
2.2- Complete integration 
Assume here that markets are perfectly integrated and that investors access all 
international investment opportunities. In other words, investors from each country are 
of type 
0
k . For the investor j, the maximization of utility subject to budget constraint 
drives to the following demand function: 
 
)1)((
1 1
rRED j 


                                                                                               (3) 
where   is the variance-covariance matrix of the c national risky assets.  
 
The total demand for the c risky assets is obtained by summing the demands of 
the n investors. In market equilibrium, the total demand is equal to the total supply of 
the c risky assets ),,,(
21 c
sssS 

. 
 
The equilibrium expected excess returns on the risky assets can thus be written 
as: 
 
S
n
rRE 

1)(                                                                                                         (4) 
 
Let 1

 SC  be the world market capitalization expressed in the reference 
country currency and 
C
S
  be the vector of proportions of the c risky assets in the 
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 Hereafter X denotes a vector and X denotes a matrix.  
8
 Without loss of generality, we consider that the currency of the c
th
 country is the reference currency. 
world stock market. The expected return on the world market is then )()( RERE
w

   
and its variance is  


2
w
. The vector of betas of the c risky assets is given by: 


 
2
1
w
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Next, multiply equation (4) by 

 : 
 
C
n
S
n
rRE 



  1)(                                                                  (5) 
            Equation (5) can be written as: 
 
C
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Substituting equation (6) into equation (4), we obtain the following relation: 
 
   ))((
1
1)(
2
rRErRE
w
w
 

                                                                             (7) 
 
It leads to the traditional global CAPM: 
 
))((1)( rRErRE
w
                                                                                            (8) 
 
For a particular asset i, equation (8) can be written as follows: 
 
))(()( rRErRE wii                                                                                             (9) 
 
Finally, we can write (9) as: 
 
),()( wii RRCovrRE                                                                                           (10) 
where 
2
)(
w
w rRE



  is the world price of market risk. Merton (1980) argues that   is a 
measure of the representative investor’s relative risk aversion. 
 The important message of the traditional global CAPM is that in equilibrium 
only international market risk, represented by the scaled covariance of stock returns and 
the world market return, is priced. Domestic risk is not rewarded because it can be 
diversified. The global CAPM prediction that individuals hold equities from around the 
world in proportion to market capitalizations is based on the assumption that there are 
no direct or indirect barriers to international investment. In practice, such barriers do 
exist. 
 
 
2.3- Partial integration 
Stock markets are partially segmented when they are neither strictly segmented nor 
perfectly integrated. In other words, some investors access all international assets, 
whereas others access only a limited set of assets. For instance, using DRs and other 
financial innovations some investors may have access to almost all traded assets in the 
world while other investors rely on only traditional financial supports and thus access to 
a limited set of assets. In these conditions, the traditional global CAPM will fail to hold 
because its main assumptions are violated.  
Let jD  be the )1)((  jkc  vector of investor j’s amount (expressed in the 
reference country currency) invested in the jkc   risky assets to which investors of type 
j access. We can write this demand as a )1( c vector by setting 
jjj
DJD  , where 
j
J  
is a ))(( jkcc   matrix equal to the ))()(( jj kckc   identity matrix augmented by 
jk  zero-lines corresponding to the jk  national assets to which investors j do not access.  
Let 
j
  be the ))()(( jj kckc   variance-covariance matrix of the jkc   
assets to which investors of type j access and )(RE  the )1)((  jkc  vector of expected 
returns on these assets. The maximisation of the utility of investors j subject to their 
budget constraints leads to the following demand function: 
 
 )1)((
1 1
rRED
jj



                                                                                             (11) 
 
Likewise, we can write this demand function as a )1( c  vector using the matrix 
j
J : 
)1)((
1 1
rREJJD jjjj 


                                                                                     (12) 
  
The total demand of the investors for the c risky assets is thus given by: 
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In equilibrium, the total demand is equal to the total supply ),,,(
21 c
sssS  , 
which leads to:
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In this partially integrated framework, the expected excess return on the c risky 
assets is given by: 
 


 
l
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SJJ
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n
rRE
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11
][1)(
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                                                                     (15) 
 
Proposition 1 
Compared to equation (4), equation (15) shows that because of market segmentation the 
covariance-variance matrix of the c risky assets   is replaced in the world equilibrium 
relationship by the adapted matrix 

 
l
j
jjj
j
JJ
n
n
0
11
][ . If investors access all 
international assets, this matrix would simply be equal to   as in the case of perfectly 
integrated markets. 
 
However, market segmentation should particularly affect the total supply of the 
c risky assets. In fact, equation (15) can also be written as: 
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0
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0
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Proposition 2 
Equation (16) says that because of segmentation, the total supply S  is replaced in the 
equilibrium valuation relationship by an adjusted supply function: 


 
l
j
jjj
j
SJJ
n
n
0
111
][ . Therefore, investors are subject to an altered world market 
portfolio.
10
 The traditional global CAPM continues to hold with regard to this altered 
portfolio but it does not hold with regard to the actual world market portfolio. By 
contrast, if markets were perfectly integrated and investors access all international 
assets, the supply function would be equal to S  and the traditional global CAPM will 
hold with regard to the actual world market portfolio. The greater the segmentation of 
the market, the greater the difference from S  of the supply function used in the 
equilibrium valuation relation.  
 
Equation (15) can also be written as: 
 


 
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By applying the well known Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury matrix identity, 
equation (17) leads to: 
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Equation (18) can also be written as: 
 
                                                 
10
This portfolio cannot be constructed in empirical tests without making strong assumptions on the 
distributions of domestic investors among the different groups. However, in empirical studies authors use 
the return on the actual portfolio and thus the traditional global CAPM does not hold. Then their results 
must be taken with precaution [Harvey (1991), De Santis and Gérard (1997) among others]. 
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This equation can be simplified as follows: 
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Next, multiply equation (20) by the vector of capitalisations (  ) and use 
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 , we obtain: 
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where   . 
 
Now, substituting (21) into (20), we have: 
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Equation (22) can be simplified as follows: 
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This finally leads to our Partially Segmented CAPM: 
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 is a parameter which reflects the international stock market 
structure. When market segmentation is weak and the number of constrained investors 
is insignificant, 0 . The term ][ 2

 
w
d
 measures the domestic risk 
unrelated to international portfolio market. In perfectly integrated markets, this risk is 
not rewarded because it is eliminated by international portfolio diversification. 
However, equation (24) says that because of stock market segmentation a part of this 
domestic risk is internationally priced. We call this part “undiversifiable domestic risk” 
which, as shown by equation (24), is measured by 


d
V . 
  
More interesting, equation (27) shows also that the price of this international 
undiversifiable domestic risk is equal to the world price of market risk (  ). In other 
words, this risk is translated into a risk premium comparable to that required on world 
market risk.  
 
For a particular asset i, equation (24) can be written as follows: 
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where 222 wiii 

  is the domestic risk unexplained by the traditional global 
CAPM. The term 
i
)(   measures the proportion of domestic risk unexplained by the 
global CAPM (  i ) internationally priced because of market segmentation. Intuitively, 
i
)(   can be seen as a measure of stock market segmentation and should vary between 
0 and 1 depending on national and international market structures. It can be inferred 
empirically from data.  
 
Finally, we can write (25) as: 
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 Our model, represented by equation (26), assumes barriers that capture explicit 
and implicit factors that affect the decision of investors to access international assets. 
Despite its apparent simplicity, this model is powerful enough to provide empirical 
content to the time-varying world stock markets structure. It says that if markets are 
partially segmented, expected returns are not only related to the world market portfolio, 
but will also require a super risk premium to compensate the investors for not holding 
perfectly diversified portfolios.   
 
               To sum up, the main conclusion of previous theoretical international CAPMs 
for partially integrated markets [Black (1974), Stulz (1981), EL-85, EL-89 and the 
models developed in the vein of these works] was that assets to which all investors 
access are priced using the traditional global CAPM as if the markets were integrated 
whereas to hold ineligible securities investors would generally require a super risk 
premium proportional to the differential risk aversion and the conditional market risk. 
Unlike these models, we establish that if a group of investors does not hold the world 
market portfolio because of explicit and/or implicit barriers on inflows and/or outflows, 
the remaining investors are also unable to hold the world market portfolio and thus a 
part of the domestic risk can be priced to compensate rational global investors for an 
inability to hold the well diversified world market portfolio.  
 
Proposition 3 
If a group of investors do not hold all international assets, the world market portfolio is 
not efficient and the traditional global CAPM must be augmented by a new factor that 
reflects the proportion of the domestic risk made undiversifiable internationally by 
markets segmentation. The more the markets become integrated, the more the premium 
required on this additional risk factor decreases and the lower the international cost of 
capital.  
 
2.4- Strict segmentation  
If because of direct or indirect barriers, investors exclusively invest in their respective 
domestic assets, markets are strictly segmented. In that case, the undiversifiable 
domestic risk in equation (26) is entirely priced. The same analysis drives to the 
traditional domestic CAPM. For the asset i from the country d, the domestic CAPM can 
be written as: 
 
))(()( rRErRE
d
i
d
ii
                                                                                      (27) 
where )(
i
RE  and )(
d
i
RE  are the expected returns on the asset i and on the market 
portfolio of country d, respectively. d
i
  is the beta of asset i with respect to the market 
portfolio of country d. 
 
 
Equation (27) can also be written as: 
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where 
2
)(
i
ii
i
rRE



  is the domestic price of market risk in country i  and 2i  is the 
variance of the domestic market portfolio i.  
 
This model suggests that expected returns in a strictly segmented market are 
determined by their systematic risk with respect to the domestic portfolio.   
 
3- An Illustration: Cost of Capital Differences 
If markets are neither fully integrated nor strictly segmented, the required return on 
corporate investments has to be computed using our partially integrated CAPM 
(equation 25). In general, this will yield to a different cost of equity than the models that 
hold in the two extreme cases of perfect integration (equation 9) and strict segmentation 
(equation 27). However, in practice, only domestic and rarely global CAPMs are used 
by practitioners and researchers to compute the cost of capital [Brounen et al. (2004) 
and Durnev et al. (2004)]. The aim of this section is to empirically examine whether, 
when markets are partially integrated, our partially integrated CAPM leads to a different 
estimation of the cost of capital than the traditional domestic CAPM and global CAPM. 
Concretely, we investigate the difference between each of these models for firms from 
several developed and emerging countries.  
          Let 
i
  be the difference between the expected rate of return on firm i obtained 
from the domestic CAPM and the partially integrated CAPM, and 
i
  the differences 
between the expected return obtained from the global CAPM and the partially integrated 
CAPM. If markets are partially integrated, 
i
  and 
i
  will differ from zero for most 
firms, but by how much? To answer this question, we assess 
i
  and 
i
  for a sample of 
firms from markets that have different degrees of integration into the world market. 
More precisely, we consider firms from Brazil, Canada, France, Malaysia, Mexico and 
the US. MSCI national indexes with gross dividend reinvestment are used to proxy 
world and national portfolio market indexes. Data on individual firms are extracted 
from DataStream International and the International Finance Corporation databases. 
Data are monthly and our sample period goes from January 2000 to December 2010. 
We consider that the US is the reference country and thus we express all returns in US 
dollar. Our models are estimated under the hypothesis of rational expectations using 
quasi-maximum likelihood approach and allowing errors to follow a GARCH(1,1) 
process.  
         For the extreme case of complete integration, expected cost of equity of the firm A 
from the country i is obtained from regressing returns on firm A (
A
ti
R
,
) on returns on the 
world market portfolio (
tw
R
,
) as in the following empirical version of the global CAPM: 
 
            
tAtA
A
tA
AA
tA
tAttw
w
tAt
A
ti
hh
rRrR
,
2
1,
2
1,
2
,
,,,,
)(





                                                                         (30) 
where 
2
,tA
h  is the empirical measure of the variance of the asset A and  
w
tA ,
  is the 
coefficient beta of the asset A with respect to the world market portfolio.  
   
         In the case of strict segmentation, the cost of equity of the firm A from the country 
i is obtained from the estimation of the following conditional version of the domestic 
CAPM: 
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where 
ti
R
,
 is the return on the market portfolio of country i and  i
tA ,
  is the coefficient 
beta of the asset A with respect to this domestic market portfolio.  
 
          As for the partial integration case, we proceed in three steps. Since the theory 
predicts that the world price of risk (  ) should be the same for each country, we 
estimate first the world equation of the model:  
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where 
2
,tw
h  is the empirical measure of the variance of the world market portfolio.   
          
          This provides us with estimates of the world price of risk ( ) and of the 
coefficients of the time-varying world variance (
2
,twh ). We then impose these estimates 
in the country estimations based on national indices to get the average degree of 
segmentation (
i
)(  ): 
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where 
2
,
22
twiitit
hh 

 , 2ith  is the empirical variance of market i and i  is the 
coefficient beta of the market portfolio of country i  with respect to the world market 
portfolio.  
            
          Finally, we impose the estimated world price of risk ( ) and country degree of 
segmentation (
i
)(  ) in the estimation of the equilibrium rate of return expected on 
each firm A from the country i: 
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           We have to notice that similar estimation strategies have been  applied by 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Hardouvelis et al. (2006) and Carrieri et al. (2007) who 
note that, although a multi-step procedure has the drawback of including sampling 
errors, it is more in line with the theory and produces more powerful tests.  
 
      Table 1 summarizes estimation results.
11
 The average price of market risk is equal to 
70.2  and is highly significant, which is consistent with the findings of earlier 
studies. As expected, emerging stock markets are significantly more segmented than 
developed markets. According to our findings, the most segmented market is Mexico 
with an average degree of segmentation 67.0 , followed by Malaysia ( 49.0 ) 
and Brazil ( 42.0 ). Our findings are comparable to those obtained using a 
different approach by Adler and Qi (2003) for Mexico  and Carrieri et al. (2007) for a 
sample of emerging countries including Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico. As for developed 
markets, the US ( 04.0 ) and Canada ( 07.0 ) are highly integrated into the 
world market followed by France ( 19.0 ). 
 
Table 1: 
 Summary of cost of capital differences 
 
Country Nb of firms Average degree of 
segmentation 
(
i
)(  ) 
 
Average absolute 
value of 
i
  
Average absolute 
value of 
i
  
Brazil 106 0.423 
(0.000) 
175.678 
(0.000) 
181.091 
(0.000) 
Canada 212 0.069 
(0.000) 
22.247 
(0.031) 
15.338 
(0.045) 
France 131 0.192 
(0.000) 
54.355 
(0.014) 
49.453 
(0.008) 
Malaysia 78 0.486 
(0.000) 
123.433 
(0.000) 
85.435 
(0.000) 
Mexico 89 0.670 
(0.000) 
97.396 
(0.000) 
198.771 
(0.000) 
US 517 0.042 
(0.000) 
11.218 
(0.063) 
10.314 
(0.011) 
Notes: For each country, this table presents the number of firms, the average degree of segmentation and the absolute average cost 
of capital differences in basis points between the three competing models (the domestic CAPM, the global CAPM and the partially 
integrated CAPM). P-values are in parentheses.   
 
          More interestingly, the three models yield significantly different cost of equity 
estimates for most cases at the 1% level and in all cases at the 10% level. The highest 
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absolute average value of 
i
  is obtained for Brazil (176 basis points) whereas the 
highest absolute average value of 
i
  is obtained for Mexico (199 basis points). The 
Firms from Brazil and Malaysia show absolute average values of 
i
  greater than 100 
basis points while firms from Brazil and Mexico show absolute average values of 
i
  
greater than 100 basis points. The average absolute differences between cost of equity 
estimates obtained from the three competing models (the domestic, global and partially 
integrated CAPMs) are significantly smaller for firms from developed countries and are 
in most cases lower than 50 basis points. Thus, from an economic perspective, the 
average absolute difference between costs of equity estimates does not seen very large 
for firms from highly integrated markets such as Canada and the US thanks to generally 
high correlations between local and global factors. Koedijk et al. (2002) compare the 
cost of equity using the domestic and the global CAPMs and report low differences for 
firms from Canada and the US. The authors explain this finding by the fact that for 
highly integrated markets such as the US and Canada the domestic CAPM prices 
indirectly global factors since these factors are already in the local market index.  
 
4- Conclusion  
Previous works on cost of capital in intermediate market structures often rely on ad-hoc 
econometric combinations of global and local risk factors. The findings of these works 
are rather heterogeneous and mostly inconclusive. In this paper, we first introduce a 
theoretical model to compute equilibrium expected asset returns in partially integrated 
markets. In contrast to previous works on international asset pricing, our approach is not 
to look into investors portfolio holdings directly but we simply consider that there are 
different types of investors’ behavior and investigate the consequences of this 
assumption on international asset pricing and market structure. Specifically, we assume 
that because of institutional and/or behavioral factors not every investor is willing or 
able to hold assets from around the world in proportion to market capitalizations and 
thus to hold the market portfolio. We show that if some investors do not want and/or are 
unable to hold international assets, the remaining investors will be unable to hold the 
world market portfolio. After all, the first investors’ holdings and the second investors’ 
holdings together make up the entire world market. As the relative per capita supply of 
the stocks that the first investors hold in limited quantities or simply do not hold is high, 
the prices of these stocks will be relatively low. Thus, a local risk premium can be 
rationalized to compensate investors for the excess supply of some stocks. In that 
context, the traditional global CAPM continues to hold with regard to an altered 
supply/world market portfolio but it does not hold with regard to the actual world 
market portfolio. The traditional global CAPM must be augmented by a new risk factor 
that reflects the part of the country-specific risk undiversifiable internationally because 
of markets segmentation. The more the markets became integrated, the more the 
premium required on this additional risk factor decreases and the lower the international 
cost of capital.  
           Second, we employ our model to assess, under the hypothesis of partial 
segmentation, the pricing errors made by investors who use the domestic or the global 
asset pricing model to price assets and compute the cost of capital of firms. We show 
that the three models (our model, the traditional global CAPM and the domestic CAPM) 
yield significantly different cost of equity estimates in most cases and that differences 
between the estimated costs of equity are higher for firms from emerging markets 
characterized by high level of segmentation. For highly integrated countries, local and 
global risk factors are often highly correlated and the three models generally lead to 
close estimations of the cost of capital.  
            Our paper suggests many potential avenues for further research. First, the 
theoretical model we introduce can be extended to take into account deviations from 
PPP and exchange rate risk. Second, a generalization of our model to an intertemporal 
framework would allow a better specification of the model because investment and 
consumption opportunities are stochastic. Third, given that several available ICAPMs 
can be viewed as particular cases of our model, the later provides a convenient 
framework to distinguish between them empirically. In particular, like the EL-89 multi-
country model, our model permits to investigate some issue that cannot be analyzed in a 
two-country framework such as dismantling investment barriers within an economic 
region. Moreover, our model has an advantage compared to the EL-89 model; removal 
of investment barriers between the segments can be partial. Finally, in terms of policy 
decisions, our model can be used to assess the consequence of reforms and liberalization 
on market efficiency and to understand regional integration dynamics.  
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